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Summary 
This thesis deals with the enforcement of intellectual property rights as an abuse of 
dominance. In particular after refusal to license a patent, which is essential for a standardized 
technology. Recently closed investigation on Samsung by the European Commission shows, 
that legal measures, such as injunction relief, become a subject to antitrust law. In other 
words, seeking for injunction relief may in some circumstances violate applicable competition 
law. The analysis will provide a hint, whereas patent holder who is dominating in particular 
market can or should be immune from EC scrutiny.  
The Commission is not willing to apply the exceptional circumstances doctrine. Perhaps it is 
determined by a possibility of unexpected results in case of a proper application, whereas the 
injunctions should not be seen as anticompetitive. Moreover, the concern seem to be 
reasonable, as the German court started to have doubts about the Commission’s approach and 
decided to submit the case for a preliminary ruling in order to assess whether in the context of 
SEP, the refusal to license and seeking for injunctions are lawful or not. Seemingly the 
rejecting trend of EC happened to become an incentive to take a deeper view on the complex 
issue in the mobile sector, where patent wars have become a platform for competition and 
where the major players are denied protection in favor of their competitors, instead of 
competition in abstracto. 
The approach presented by the EC is a shift in interpreting how the intersection between IPR 
and dominance work. Nowadays it is a common practice to allege dominance for merely 
holding the SEP. Any activity with potential adversely affect to the competition is considered 
abusive, but without detailed analysis in the market power, such conclusions should not be 
reached. The market share, which considered as an effective tool determining the market 
power seems to become irrelevant in the context of standardization. It is a new age for 
antitrust law, where the dynamic environment allows interfering patent disputes. 
Respectively, the jurisdiction in particular Member States, such as Germany and Netherlands 
seem not to be in consistency with the mainstream approach presented by the EC. This brings 
to pessimistic supposition, that he EC favours competitors, rather than promoting competition, 
obliging undertakings to share their technology with their direct rivals.  
Exercising intellectual property rights becomes abusive only in exceptional circumstances. 
Mere holding of IP rights should not confer dominance per se. There should be careful 
assessment of market power, only on case-by-case basis. It is also truth, that abstaining from 
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sharing essential patents creates a barrier to entry and allows imposing excessively high 
royalties, which in consequence affects the final price of the product. Samsung had de facto 
refused to licence its patent, which makes it similar to cases of compulsory licensing, where 
CJEU established,  after fulfilling certain criteria, the undertaking might be required to share 
its IPR or abstain from exercising excluding rights. Those conditions relate to emergence of a 
new product, objective justification and preservation of secondary market. Samsung seem to 
fit the criteria for compulsory licensing, however the question remains when the rejection of 
FRAND terms deems to be not objectively justified. If the rejection finds to be justified, the 
ruling of the case might be contrary to the decision of the EC and might even affect the policy 
of the EC. 
The doctrine of exceptional circumstances, established in prominent cases by CJEU was 
undermined by the EC firstly in Microsoft case and now it extends to standard technology 
context. The situation might change subject to pending preliminary ruling on how refusal to 
licence and seeking for injunction should be handled. This ruling can confirm the EC policy 
toward SEP owners, but if it takes into account the exceptional circumstances cases, the 
judgement might bring many changes to the table. 
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Abbreviations 
CJEU The Court of Justice of European Union 
EC   The European Commission 
ETSI European Telecommunication Standard Institution 
EU   European Union 
FRAND Fair, Reasonable and Non- Discriminatory terms 
GC General Court 
IPR   Intellectual property right 
OJ   Official Journal 
OS   Operating System 
SEP   Standard Essential Patent 
SSO Standard Setting Organization 
R&D   Research and development 
TFEU   Treaty on the Functioning of the  
European Union 
TRIPS The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Samsung holds essential patent for 3G UMTS technology, which is used in mobile devices. 
As a licensor of standardized patent, he is entitled to obtain a royalties from competitors using 
this patent in their products. Samsung had committed to license its technology to any willing 
party on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. However there was a conflict of 
interests with the major competitor on the market of smartphones using the 3G technology, 
since parties could not reach the consensus on the royalty rate for licensing. Therefore license 
agreement was not concluded. Nonetheless the competitor implemented the 3G technology in 
its products, regardless of not being a rightful licensee.  In 2011, Samsung sought injunctive 
relief in various Member States of EU against alleged infringements of certain of its patent 
rights, which it has declared essential to implemented European mobile devices standards. 
The EC wanted to investigate whether in doing so Samsung has failed to honour its 
irrevocable commitment given in 1998 to the ETSI to license any SEP on FRAND terms.
1
 In 
December 2012, the EC informed Samsung of its preliminary view that it considered Apple as 
a willing licensee for Samsung's SEPs and against this background, the seeking of injunctions 
constitutes a breach of Article 102 TFEU.
2
 In order to avoid the fee from the EC, Samsung 
decided to settle by stating a new commitment in April 2014, that he will license the patent to 
any willing licensee on FRAND terms which are going to be determined by courts or in 
arbitrary proceedings and the negotiation period should be no longer than twelve months.  
Interesting fact is, that after careful reading of the commitment it can be deducted, that it is 
made subject to the result of preliminary ruling in German case pending on before CJEU. 
Therefore, in case of optimistic ruling for patent holder in the courts, the commitment might 
be revoked in the future. 
1.2 Purpose 
This thesis aims to answer a question if seeking for injunction relief by dominant undertaking 
is abusive. The reasoning in refusal to licence in exceptional circumstances, which was 
                                                 
1
 Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against Samsung (press release), Brussels, 31 January 2012, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-89_en.htm.  
2
 Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Samsung on potential misuse of mobile phone 
standard-essential patents (press release), Brussels, 21 December 2012, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-12-1448_en.htm. 
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established by CJEU seems to be misunderstood and neglected by the Commission. In order 
to do so, Samsung case will be analysed from the point of view of IMS Health and Magill 
tests. Additionally, there will be an attempt to assess whether the commitment to licence on 
FRAND terms waives right to exercise the excluding rights relating to intellectual property.  
1.3 Delimitations 
Competition law brings many issues relating to standardization process and patent disputes.  
The agreements between undertakings and mergers are outside of scope of analysis since it 
would become too broad spectrum. Next of all, regardless of patent war between major 
manufacturers, the scope of observations and analysis is focused on art. 102 TFEU and 
European jurisdiction. Therefore the investigation on Samsung will be viewed with exclusion 
of expansive and complex American case law. In order to concentrate on the refusal to license 
and exercising IPR in standardization context there will be no discussion on what are or 
should be FRAND commitments. In this thesis the essential facility theory will also not be 
examined, since it is never mentioned by CJEU and lacks of consistency in the literature on 
competition law. Focusing on European Union dimension and the EC policy the national laws 
of Member States shall not be brought up, with exception of the rulings of German courts. 
1.4 Method 
This thesis will apply a traditional legal dogmatic method of analysing the law in the EU legal 
order. Dominant position will be evaluated basing on the case law from CJEU. In conjunction, 
Commission guidelines and official communicates will shed a light on the policy of European 
authorities.  Later on, an application of rules established by the Court in refusal to license into 
standardization context, since there is no judgment on SEP holders, abusing their IPR. 
Additionally there will be a reference to German cases, which shows different approach from 
European mainstream and create a breakthrough in the competition law. To support the 
analysis and observation there are going to be references to European and American literature 
on refusal to license and exercising excluding rights of intellectual property. 
1.5 Outline 
This thesis will be organized in the following manner. The first chapter will present general 
considerations on dominance by briefly explaining the scope of art. 102 TFEU. It is aimed to 
bring the view on how the dominance was interpreted in the prominent cases, established over 
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decades, and how it evolves in the dynamic environment of competition law. Next of all,   
chapter I will provide with the definition of abuse and typical forms of abuse, in order to 
confront them with the conduct of SEP holders. After the relevant definitions, the chapter will 
contain a description of an intersection between Intellectual Property Rights and dominance. 
Third chapter is focused on the development of exceptional circumstances doctrine. This 
doctrine might bring a new perspective on the traditional point of view on the intersection 
between IPR and dominance. Further on, the relevant case law will be presented, where 
essential inputs became decisive factor for compulsory licenses. Elaboration on exceptional 
circumstances doctrine will go through its flexible application in Microsoft case, which might 
be seen as controversial due of the Commission extensive competences. 
The fourth part deals with the standardization process, with the angle on how the implemented 
technology confers market power on particular SEP holders. In that chapter, the encouraging 
features of holding standardized technology can be found, as well as dangers which it may 
entail. Unlawful conducts including patent hold-ups and unreasonable refusal to license are 
the major threats. 
The last chapter is dedicated to analyze Samsung case in the light of exercising IPRs and 
compulsory licensing applying the exceptional circumstances doctrine. In order to do so, the 
refusal to license 3G UMTS patent will be compared with particular cases, where the Court 
found the refusal abusive and ruled compulsory license. The purpose of such is to show, that 
Samsung could actually have escaped from the allegations of the European Commission, if 
successfully proving, that the refusal was objectively justified.  
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2 Legal framework 
2.1 Scope of article 102 TFEU 
2.1.1 Dominant position 
Concept of dominant position is a combination of economic assessment and legal 
considerations, designed mainly to protect consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient 
allocation of resources.
3
 In established EU case law it has been recognised that consumer can 
be indirectly harmed by action that harms the competition structure of the market.
4
 Although 
art. 102 TFEU does not seem to bring a clear and meaningful definition of dominance, the 
case law provided by CJEU allows to interpret it as a position of certain economic strength. 
Prominent cases are United Brands
5
 and Hoffmann-La Roche
6
, where the Court stated, that 
dominance is “a position of economic strength enjoyed by undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately consumers.” The Community Courts have never drawn a distinction between 
independent behaviour and the ability to prevent competition and considered them as 
equivalent inferring that satisfying one of them implies the other one.
7
 
In competition law the efficiency is usually declared as a key factor, especially from an 
economic point of view. Efficient competition is an economic term, used to describe a 
situation where nobody can exercise substantial market power in the relevant market.
8
 The 
market power is understood as the ability to profitably raise price (through the restriction of 
output) above the level that would prevail under competitive conditions. In the view of EC, 
the market power should be assessed by the power to raise prices by restricting output without 
incurring a significant loss of sales or revenues.
9
 Undertaking which is capable of doing so for 
a significant period of time does not face sufficiently effective competitive constraints and can 
                                                 
3
 N. Kroes, SPEECH/05/512 of former European Commissioner for competition policy, London 2005. 
4
 Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215; Case C-501/06 P 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2009] ECR I-9291; Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV 
and others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-4529. 
5
 C-27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
6
 C 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461. 
7
 D. Geradin, P. Hofer, F. Louis, N. Petit, M. Walker, The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition law, 
Research Paper on the Modernization of Article 82 EC, Global Competition Law Centre, July 2005, at p. 3. 
8
 Ibid. at p. 4 
9
 Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, O. J. C 165 , 
11/07/2002 P. 0006 – 0031, par. 73. 
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thus generally be regarded as dominant. Above mentioned increases include the various ways 
in which the parameters of competition can be influenced to the advantage of the dominant 
undertakings and to the detriment of consumer i.e. prices, output but also innovation. 
Decisions made by a particular undertaking must be largely insensitive to the actions of 
competitors, customers and, ultimately, consumers. The EC may consider that effective 
competitive constraints are absent even if some actual or potential competition remains.
10
  
The relevant market refers to particular product. For any good or service there should be a 
substitute and normally the assessment relates to the possible substitutes for product taking 
into account its function, its suitability for satisfying user needs, and its price.
11
 The 
Commission and CJEU pay much attention on demand and supply side of products. The 
concept of relevant market implies effective competition between the products that form part 
of it and this presupposes that there is a sufficient degree of interchangeability between all the 
products forming part of the same market insofar as specific use of such products is 
concerned.
12
 It might happen that the possibility is limited to such extent, that the competition 
diminishes. Such a situation took place in Michelin’s case where CJEU found that there is no 
real source of competition if product in the market ‘is to a limited extent interchangeable with 
other products’13 Dominance in a particular market can be achieved by introducing highly 
advanced technological product, which by its nature or by law has no substitute. It creates its 
own market.
14
 In case of IPR the substitutability is the most important factor. Such a situation, 
where substitutes cannot be found or produced is present in standardized technology 
implementation. Since a particular product has become standard or de facto standard, anyone 
who is interested in production will have to obtain a license.  
   
2.2 Abuse of dominant position 
The purpose of art. 102 TFEU is to regulate undertakings that are dominant, in particular to 
prevent them from using market power to impair the effective competition. The list of 
practices in the Treaty is not exhaustive and provides only mere examples of how the abuse 
                                                 
10
 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, O.J. C 45, 24/02/2009, 
p. 7–20, par. 10-11. 
11
 S. Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights – The Regulation of Innovation, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 151. 
12
 C 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461 at para. 38. 
13
 C 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461 at para.37. 
14
 G. Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe, London Sweet&Maxwell, 2008, 3
rd
 edition, at p. 991. 
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may be like. According to Craig and De Burca there are three issues which had to be 
considered when talking about abuse.
15
 Namely: who is art. 102 TFEU designed to protect; 
what kind of behaviour are abusive; and which market should be assessed.  
As for the first issue, prevention of harm to consumers is the ultimate goal of art. 102 TFEU, 
although it may require protection of competitive process. Since protection of consumers may 
clash with interest of competitors this issue will always bring controversy due lack of 
clarification of rules. Joliet proposed to restrict art. 102 TFEU only to exploitative behaviour 
harmful to consumers, with real link between the harm and market power of dominant 
undertaking.
16
 However, the Commission seems to be more flexible and use art. 102 TFEU 
for further reaching extent. 
The second issue relates to behaviour. Such behaviour must be different from a normal 
competitive strategy. It means that art. 102 TFEU prohibits unfair pricing and limits on 
productive capacity.
17
 It is established in case law that dominant position entails a special 
responsibility, which “does not allow to impair genuine undistorted competition on the 
common market”.18 In consequence, dominant undertaking is deprived of right to adopt a 
conduct, which would not be abusive and unobjectionable if taken by non-dominant 
undertaking.
19
 Even though undertakings are allowed to protect their own interests when 
attacked by competitors they cannot do that in a manner which strengthens their dominant 
position, since it will be considered as an abuse.
20
 The problem with application of art. 102 
TFEU has to be judged in light of the specific circumstances of each case where competition 
might be weakened. This is a subject to exceptional circumstances. 
The last issue identified by Craig and De Burca is the leveraging of market. The abuse of 
dominance on one market will be fought back if such dominance created effects on a different 
market, even without dominance on the latter one.
21
 The example of such is when undertaking 
gains control over intellectual property, which is essential for other undertakings, and refuses 
to supply it, preventing everyone from both competing and emerging on a separate market.  
                                                 
15
 See P. Craig, G. De Burca, EU Law – text, cases and materials, Oxford University Press, 2011 5th edition, at p. 
1024 – 1025.  
16
 R. Joliet, Monopolization and Abuse of a Dominant Position A Comparative Study of the American and 
European Approaches to the Control of Economic Power, published at Law Faculty at the University of 
Michigan, 1970. 
17
 P. Craig, G. De Burca, (n 18) at p. 1025. 
18
 C 322/81 Michelin v. Commission [1983] ECR 3461 at para. 57; T-203/01 Michelin v Commission [2003] 
ECR II-4071 at para. 55; T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v Commission ECR II-2805, at para. 
355, 358,  
19
 T-51/89 Tetra Pak v Commission [1990] ECR II-309, at para. 23. 
20
 United Brands (n 6), at para. 189;  Michelin v Commission (n 21) at para 54-55; T-155/06 Tomra Systems ASA 
and Others v Commission ECR II-4361, at para. 207. 
21
 See P. Craig, G. De Burca, (n 18), at p. 1026. 
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2.3 IPR and dominant position 
In this chapter the dominant position will be confronted with IPR in order to find the answer 
for a question - if ownership of IPR can justify finding a dominance.  
Whether a particular product becomes desired in the market the connection between IPR and 
market share will depend on ability of competitors to produce substitute goods of same 
quality or value. The IPR protecting a particular product becomes a “barrier to entry” to other 
suppliers producing goods of the same value or quality.
22
 It happens that patents play a 
significant role when analysing if an undertaking achieved a dominant position in a relevant 
market. When a particular technology becomes a standard, then a licence for the patents is 
necessary for an undertaking to operate in the relevant market. Those patents thus become a 
barrier to entry.
23
  
In most cases the dominance is determined by market power of a particular undertaking. 
Market shares are undoubtedly a useful preliminary tool in assessing market power, but they 
are not enough. Market shares alone, cannot be sufficient for a finding of dominance. They 
are a poor tool for measuring i.e. the constraints posed by potential competition, for 
adequately ascertaining the conditions of competition in innovative markets.
24
 Hence, in the 
context of IPR the market shares do not demonstrate adequately the market power. In the age 
of new technologies patents create the market power. On the other hand they cannot be 
directly interpreted as equivalent of market power, but considered along with “exceptional 
circumstances”, whereas market share, buyer power and entry or expansion barriers are 
important, albeit not only factors required when assessing dominant position.
25
 There is much 
uncertainty as to the relationship between market shares and the “other factors”. Such lack of 
a clear analytical framework is detrimental to the rigour of the analysis conducted to assess 
dominance. Commission is leading the way to define a consistent analytical framework for 
the assessment of dominance, equivalent to asserting that a company has market power over 
its customers, which is part of the legal definition of dominance. At most, the consideration 
that a company may be an “unavoidable trading partner” will assist the Commission in 
identifying the relevant parameters – outside market shares – that are relevant for a finding of 
dominance in the particular industry under the factors that make customers dependent upon 
                                                 
22
 G. Tritton, Intellectual property in Europe, London Sweet &Maxwell, 2008, 3
rd
 edition, at p. 992. 
23
 Ibid. at p. 993 
24
 D. Geradin, (n 7), at p. 10 
25
 C 62/86, AKZO v. Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359 
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the allegedly dominant player.
26
 The concept of unavoidable trading partner was presented by 
CJEU in Hoffman La Roche. It stated, that undertaking which has a very large market share 
and holds it for some time, by means of the volume of production and the scale of the supply, 
being able to meet rapidly the demand from those who would like to break away from the 
undertaking which has the largest market share – is by virtue of that share in a position of 
strength which makes it an unavoidable trading partner and which, already because of this 
secures for it, at the very least during relatively long periods, that freedom of action which is 
the special feature of a dominant position
27
. Under the Hoffmann-La Roche and AKZO 
terminology, it was established that barriers to entry/expansion are present on each and every 
market, since it would only be in ”exceptional circumstances” that a company enjoying high 
market shares may not be in a position to exert market power
28
.     
The CJEU reassured long time ago, that ownership of IPR does not amount to dominance. In 
case of Deutsche Grammophon it was stated that possession of IPR did not automatically 
amount to a position of dominance.
29
 Manufacturer who held copyrights was not dominant 
merely by exercising his exclusive rights to distribute the protected article. Article 102 TFEU 
requires power to impede the maintenance of effective competition over a considerable part of 
the relevant market – in particular to the existence of any producers making similar products 
and to their position on the market.
30
 Hence, IPR cannot be associated with dominance, as 
automatic result of exclusive rights, which gives negative right for protection of exploitation 
of innovative product. As Heimler wrote, it is like with a physical property - the right to 
exclude others from the free use of intellectual property does not imply market power.
31
 
However, the actual possibilities of commercial exploitation depend upon the extent of 
demand and competition in the market for the protected product or process.
32
 The other 
approach is to consider IPR as a parallel feature coinciding with dominance. In case of 
Telemarketing the CJEU stated that restriction on relevant market created by national law, 
should not preclude the application of art 102 TFEU.
33
 The infringement is when a firm 
reserves itself a right to prevent carrying out activity by another undertaking on separate 
market. 
                                                 
26
 D. Geradin, (n 7), at p. 14 
27
 C 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979]   ECR 461 at para. 41 
28
 D. Geradin, (n 7), at p. 10. 
29
 S. Anderman, (n 11), p. 169. 
30
 C 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co KG [1971] ECR 487 16. 
31
 A. Heimler, Competition Law Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights (March 4, 2008). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105326 
32
 S. Anderman, (n 11), p. 169. 
33
 C II/84 Telemarketing [1985] ECR 3261.at. Para 16. 
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Technological advantage can be also a factor reinforcing the dominant position. In Hilti
34
 the 
competition authorities found, that advantageous research and development is such factor. 
Based on that, the exclusive patent licence is viewed as a barrier to entry since it prevents 
access to the technology by potential competitors. Similarly in Tetra Pak I
35
, technological 
superiority achieved by capital investment and in Michelin,
36
 where the lead established by 
investment and research on innovative product was stressed. The situation becomes even 
more serious in this context if an undertaking is the only one in the market possessing such 
technology, not allowing competitors to enter relevant market. Such might happen if product 
market is defined in sufficiently narrow terms to create a single product market. Then IPR 
could extinguish the competition and confirm dominant position.
37
 This happened in Hugin
38
 
case where spare parts were considered as a separate market. The dominance arose from the 
fact that only cash registered maintained by Hugin could not find substitutes for suppliers. 
Therefore, holding IPR prevented from competing in the maintenance market. 
Competition law and IPR are confronted by apparent antinomy of the respective goals. Both 
aim to foster innovation and provide products of highest quality in order to satisfy consumer 
demand, but on the other hand, the purpose of IPR is to preserve the access to the product in 
order to enable the creator or owner to enjoy exclusive rights. Turner proposed a view that 
IPR create monopolies, but competition law seeks to prevent them
39
. However according to 
Ghidini, IPRs do not per se confer monopolies in economic sense, since they typically allow 
the entrance of new or substitute products onto the market
40
. Nevertheless, in some 
circumstances the market power created by IPR turns into a tool which allows to foreclose 
third party competition and which may result with hidden monopolization. Such as it 
happened in IMS Health
41
 case and RTE
42
. 
It is argued that in some cases, not simply competition is hampered but also the dynamic 
process of innovation is at stake. Therefore, antitrust remedies should ‘march in’ to preserve 
the ultimate goals of both branches of law.
43
 Anderman adds, that if technological supremacy 
is viewed as helping to establish dominance, it could be argued that EC competition law 
                                                 
34
 C 53/92P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-1439 
35
 T-51/89 Tetra Pak v Commission [1990] ECR II-309 
36
 C 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461 
37
 S. Anderman, (n 11), p. 173. 
38
 C 22/78 Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v Commission [1979] ECR 1869. 
39
 See J. Turner, Intellectual Property and EU Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2010. 
40
 G. Ghidini, E. Arezzo, On the Intersection of IPRs and Competition Law With Regard to 
Information Technology Markets, European Competition Law Annual, 2005, at p. 3. 
41
 Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG[2004] ECR I-5039 
42
 Joined cases C-241 & 242/91P, RTE (Magill TV Guides) [1995] ECR I-743 
43
 G. Ghidini, ( n 40), at p. 2 
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appears to be levying a penalty for R&D investment and high quality of product.
44
 In fact, it 
was part of reasoning made by French government in Michelin case.
45
 
In hi-tech industry, the presence of strong network effects creates a probability of customers 
change over to a different product minimal if not actually impossible. Intellectual protection 
over the standardized technology gives the IP owner an advantage to control the degree of 
competition throughout the level of interoperability it is willing to grant to its competitors.
46
 If 
IPR is combined with de facto monopoly, the mere ownership of IPR is sufficient to justify 
finding the dominance. This gives a presumption that finding dominance can solely be based 
on existence of IPR. On the other hand, this relationship might be also explained in the 
context of the special definition of dominance, which is combined with doctrine of 
exceptional circumstances.  
 
                                                 
44
 S. Anderman, (n 11), p. 172. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 G. Ghidini (n 40) 
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3 Evolution of exceptional 
circumstances doctrine 
3.1 Single product market and IPR 
The new approach for establishing dominant position merely by IPR came with cases of 
Volvo v. Veng
47
 and CICRA & Maxicar v. Renault.
48
 In first case, the Court considered 
whether refusal to supply goods covered by IPR might constitute abuse. It was said, that 
refusal itself is not abuse. Court referred to the autonomous concept of “specific subject 
matter”, known before from Deuthsche Grammophon case. However, the dominant 
undertaking exercising its exclusive rights in a way that it becomes arbitrary refusal, price 
fixing on unfair level or when it decides not to produce any more spare parts for a particular 
model which is still in circulation is abusive, provided that such conduct is liable to affect 
trade between Member States.
49
 It was more probable for the refusal to license decision to be 
treated as legitimate, while in fact it would have been anti-competitive.
50
 The model that the 
Court followed emphasised the economic right of the innovator to receive remuneration.
51
 
Such a reading effectively suggested that IPR logic prevailed over competition concerns.
52
. 
The Court laid down the grounds for the ‘exceptional circumstances test’, which is a new 
approach for determining that IPR holder is subjected to a compulsory licensing.
53
 
CJEU decided, that in a situation, where relevant market is reduced to a product covered by 
IPR, the preclusion of substitutes ensured finding of dominance itself. This means that 
actually a mere holding of IPR can lead to dominance, since the possible enforcement of 
holder’s right makes it impossible for the customer to obtain a substitute product.54 Friden 
concluded, that “the crucial point is a definition of the relevant market.”55 If relates to the 
supply or services, protected by IPR, then the right can in practice confer on its holder a 
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dominance. Lack of substitutes for products or services logically implies dominance, in his 
opinion.
56
 Hence, single product market becomes a platform for dominance or even monopoly 
because of essential input or infrastructure.  
3.2 Exceptional circumstances 
The problematic relationship between Intellectual Property regulations and competition rules 
is exemplified by the CJEU’s jurisprudence concerning refusals to license.57 That particular 
case law is part of the “refusal to supply” jurisdiction, that is notoriously “difficult and 
controversial topic in the competition law”.58 CJEU has established the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ test which is explaining how competition law can be used for compulsory 
licensing of IPR. The ‘exceptional circumstances’ test is defined generally as a “test to 
balance the conflicting claims of the statutory monopoly granted under IP law with 
competition law concerns about the exclusionary effects of the IP monopoly right”.59 The 
prominent cases are Magill
60
, Bronner
61
, IMS Health
62
 and controversial Microsoft
63
 case. As 
such, those cases represent a specific application of the rule of reason analysis applied in 
refusal to deal cases 
3.2.1 Magill test 
In Magill, the CJEU had shown application of exceptional circumstances doctrine stating that 
claim for IPR strengthens factual monopoly into legal monopoly creating situation where no 
competition from third party is permitted to exist on the relevant market. In other words, the 
CJEU found that under exceptional circumstances the use of IPR might be abusive.
64
 Hence, 
the ruling established criteria that can be used to force the undertaking to involuntarily licence 
out its IPR. Magill was the first case where compulsory licensing was ruled for the sake of 
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competition law, basing on so-called sufficiently exceptional situation of Magill.
65
 Those 
exceptional circumstances consisted of three major facts. First, ‘there was no actual or 
potential substitute for a weekly television guide’, for which there was a ‘specific, constant 
and regular consumer demand’.66 Secondly, the appellants were clearly trying to reserve a 
secondary market by excluding all (potential) competition.
67
 The TV broadcaster reserved 
possibility to introduce the new product solely by himself
68
. Lastly, the appellants could not 
provide an objective justification for the refusal to supply.
69
  
Angelov called those exceptional circumstances a new balance, which at first sight looked as 
tipping the scales in favour of static efficiency considerations.
70
 The question that arises in 
Magill is why CJEU changed again its attitude known from Volvo case, relaxing its approach 
and interfering in refusal to licence. As Monti argues, there is a presumption that a refusal to 
license IP rights benefits the economy.
71
 As a result, forcing IP holders to license out their 
inventions could potentially undermine the economic rationale for IP rights and ultimately 
harm consumer welfare.
72
 Reasoning in Magill case was based on that the new third party 
who was offering a new, distinct product from the initial one protected by an IP right, then the 
risk of a drop in future investments in innovation would be reduced, since the position of the 
initial IP holder will not be challenged. Since the position of IPR holder is not be challenged 
by new product in secondary market, the IPR owner can be forced to license out, for the sake 
of entering new product on the market. Such an approach present in Magill case evolved in 
the further cases, concerning the exceptional circumstances.  
 
3.2.2 IMS Health test 
Volvo and Magill cases created a framework for the application of principles that CJEU used 
in IP related cases. The concept of exceptional circumstances forcing the dominant 
undertaking to licence its IPR is present in German case IMS Health
73
, which contains of four 
separate judgements – three interim orders (where two were issued by GC and one by CJEU) 
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and one judgement of CJEU. Out of those four, the most important are the final order of GC.
74
 
The Commission had a view that dominant undertaking can leverage its market power in at 
least one component of a product to dominate the whole market.
75
  
IMS Health had copyrights on regional pharmaceutical sales reports which had become de 
facto industry standard, since before it was sent to pharmacies and doctors free of charge. In 
practise, only this system was accepted by the industry.
76
 The German court granted IMS 
Health interim injunctions against its competitors who tried to use their format called ‘1860 
brick structure’. The issue of refusal to license in the light of art. 102 TFEU was a subject to 
preliminary ruling. CJEU stated, that exclusive use of IPR is an abuse if conditions 
established in Magill and Bronner are met. The CJEU referred in its judgement also to the 
Volvo case and reiterating Bronner case summarized Magill. In order to apply the reasoning 
to IMS Health the circumstances of abusive refusal must fulfil a four-stage test:  
1. The product or service protected by copyright is indispensable for carrying on a 
particular business, 
2. The refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is potential 
consumer demand,  
3. The refusal is not justified by objective considerations, and  
4. The refusal is such as to reserve to the owner of the IPR the relevant market in 
Member State concerned by eliminating competition.
77
  
 
The CJEU decided that those conditions must be cumulative.
78
 Some authors write that the 
test contains of three conditions,
79
 however for the purpose of more detailed approach this 
four stage presented by Killick will be used.
80
 The emergence of a new product was already 
established in Magill case
81
, so in IMS case, the CJEU elaborated on the issue, stating that 
undertaking requesting for licence must not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicate goods 
or services already offered on the secondary market by the owner of IPR. Instead, the product 
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must be new in the meaning that it is not offered by the owner of the IPR and for which there 
is certain consumer demand.
82
 Hence, the product does not need to be innovative but simply 
different from the one offered by IPR holder. The competitor of IMS argued, that the product 
which they intend to introduce to the market is of a different quality and nature comparing to 
IMS. Basically because of more advanced features. 
As to indispensability, it has to be examined whether alternative solutions exist, even though 
they might be more expensive than or technologically not as advanced as the concerned 
product or service. At least, it has to be proven, that the use of these alternative solutions 
would lead to an unprofitable production of goods or services whereas the usage of the 
existing good or service would allow a viable supply.
83
 The test is not fulfilled, if there are 
“alternative solutions, even if they are less advantageous”. Nor it would be fulfilled, unless 
there are obstacles making it “impossible or at least unreasonably difficult” for others to 
create alternatives.
84
 The Court also clarifies that when assessing indispensability: it must be 
established, at the very least, that the creation of those products or services is not 
economically viable for production on a scale comparable to that of the undertaking that 
controls the existing product or service.
85
 
In order to find if there is exclusion of competitors, the CJEU referring to Bronner case
86
 
invited national court to assess whether the upstream and downstream markets are related in 
such manner, that upstream product is indispensable for the supply of the downstream 
product.
87
 The second market does not have to be actual, it might be potential or hypothetical. 
As Ghidini concluded, it seems that the finding of an abuse is strictly dependent on the fact 
that the incumbent, by its behaviour, prevents access to the market to a new product/service, 
different from the one that it produces, but whose development requires the use of the 
protected standard. Thus, it seems, the unlawful restrictions on competition are limited to 
those behaviours that impede, by means of the refusal to license, the development of 
derivative (related) products/markets.
88
 A refusal constitutes an abuse if it prevents the 
development of a secondary market. If this is the case, the conduct of the dominant 
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undertaking will have effects contrary to the purpose of the IPR to further innovations, and 
will represent a restriction of dynamic competition.
89
 
The demand for an upstream product that was not marketed independently by IMS Health, 
existed only because of competitor’s desire to use the copyrighted ‘brick structure’ to produce 
and market their regional data service. This situation differs from Volvo, where Volvo 
supplied body panels to its authorized dealers, and Magill where the three broadcast networks 
did publish their own individual TV guides.
90
 According to Venit, in IMS case the CJEU 
eliminated the leveraging requirement, requiring only two different products where one of 
which is an indispensable input for the other, as opposed to two different markets.
91
 The 
significance of this approach and its arguable departure from Magill derives from the fact that 
the CJEU appears to have applied a ‘leveraging analysis’ to a case in which there was no 
independent supply and demand for the upstream copyrighted ‘brick structure’ The 
replacement of a two market test makes the infringer's dependence on the input covered by 
the IPR the key factor in a manner reminiscent of Magill in which dominance has been 
assumed to exist because of customer dependence rather than market position. Left 
unchecked, such approach substantially increases scope for the compulsory licensing, since 
every infringer needs to prove that he requires access to the IPR in order to compete.
92
 
The criterion of objective justification was not elaborated in this judgment. Its status depends 
on the reward and incentive to innovation that underlies the granting a monopoly under IP 
law. The EU Courts have not to date elaborated on the meaning of this condition in the IP. To 
some extent, the CJEU would accept that the refusal of the IPR owner to grant licenses can be 
objectively justified by the preservation of the incentive to innovate through the securing of 
its monopoly reward, this condition would also be consistent with IP law.
93
  
IMS Health case is example of abusive use of IPR over the standard it created. Although not 
officially, but actually after successful implementation of ‘brick structure’ in German 
pharmaceutical industry, they have created de facto standard for sales reports. Therefore, IMS 
tried to exclude competitors from using the standard by exercising IPR. The exceptional 
circumstances pointed out in IMS case are that firstly the dominant company has made 
industry customers depended on its ‘brick structure’ and subsequently claimed it IPR refusing 
competitors to use the system so no products could be created basing on it. As Killick 
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observes the alternative theory would have been that the appropriation of open standards 
constituted an exceptional circumstance under Magill.
94
 However, the Commission never 
expanded on this point and it did not base the compulsory licence on this line of reasoning. 
Standardisation is mentioned as an afterthought when the Commission justifies why the 
decision would not have an adverse effect on intellectual property protection in general.
95
 
Further on, Killick added that IMS could be the case, where the standard was initially open 
without protective IPRs, where subsequently those rights were invoked by one of the 
companies that developed the standard in circumstances deemed to be abusive. Therefore, it is 
important that Article 102TEFU could be applicable if an individual company seeks to rely on 
an intellectual property right to close the standard and exclude all competitors.
 96
 IMS Health 
case could have become a milestone for interpreting and ruling on cases where dominant 
undertakings are trying to exclude competitors by exercising IPR. In exceptional 
circumstances, after application of the test, such a conduct would be classified accurately as 
abusive or not.  
3.2.3 Microsoft and incentive balance test 
Although there is some inconsistency of CJEU's judgments in both Magill and IMS Health 
cases, the Commission continued to take an expansive view of those situations in which the 
refusal to license may infringe article 102 TFEU.
97
Most notably, in its recent Microsoft 
decision
98
, the Commission has taken the position that Magill identified three distinct types of 
exceptional circumstances thereby suggesting that the Magill test consists of three distinct 
abuses rather than a single cumulative set of conditions as established by the CJEU in the IMS 
Health judgment. The Commission, which appears to give an equal weight to the cases not 
involving IPRs, has further argued in Microsoft that the extraordinary circumstances 
identified in Magill were not exhaustive and that there must be other situations, where 
particular facts could also render a refusal to license an abusive behaviour.
99
 In this case, the 
Commission claimed, that refusal to supply information on interoperability is abusive.  
The Commission had found that Microsoft infringed art. 102 TFEU in the market for client 
PC operating systems because it refused to license interface information of its working group 
server operating systems to its competitor Sun Microsystems. Without this interface 
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information, the operating systems of the competitors could not communicate with the 
Microsoft systems. The abusive conduct was to impede competition in the relevant market 
and to create barriers to entry for new competitors. The main argument of Commission was 
that the refusal to disclose the interface information causes a risk of eliminating competition, 
which in consequence has negative effects on technical development and consumer 
welfare.
100
 The point of the incentive balance test was to outweigh the effect of refusal to 
license with effect of compulsory licensing on innovative products. Commission decided that 
negative impact of refusal should be diminished by positive effect on innovative climate in 
relevant market.
101
 
When comparing to Magill, it must be said that Microsoft’s competitors were in a different 
situation, when Sun, one of main competitors, was sending a letter in 1998 with its objections 
and requests.
102
 They had a 60 percent share of the work group server operating system 
market at that time and a 27 percent share at the time of the decision. Vendors that relied on 
the Linux open source operating system had entered the market after Sun’s letter and had a 5-
15 percent share of the work group server operating system market in 2003.
103
 Microsoft's 
dominant position on the client PC operating systems market exhibits, as the Commission 
stated, 'extraordinary features', since notably, its market shares on that market are more than 
90% and since Windows represents the 'quasi-standard 'for those operating systems.
104
 It is an 
example of how (quasi) standard was acquired involuntarily due the market share, rather than 
standard setting process. Since Microsoft’s product was recognized and popular, it became de 
facto standard. On the appeal, the Court had to decide whether refusal to supply with IP 
would eliminate competition in the work group server market. Therefore, criteria established 
in Magill and IMS Health must have been fulfilled cumulatively. 
The concept of aforementioned new product was analysed in different manner. Since 
Microsoft was pleading that competitors are aiming to copy their product (instead of 
introducing a new one), the Court decided that not only a new product qualifies for abuse in 
the context of refusal to supply, but limitation of technical development must also be taken 
into consideration. At the same time rejecting Microsoft argument and stating, that refusal 
leads to limit production and development.
105
 As Magill and IMS highlighted the new product 
as consumer demand in Microsoft case the GC interpreted consumer interest as a foreground 
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of technical development which art. 102 TFEU is a guardian. Lacking of interoperability, 
consumers relied only on Windows software and thus, competitors could not offer their own 
innovative products. On the margin, while reasoning the consumer welfare harm the GC 
referred directly to the market shares, stating that Microsoft impaired the effective 
competitive structure on the work group server operating systems by acquiring a significant 
market share on that market.
106
 Therefore, for this criterion there was replacement of the new 
product test with limitation of technical development. The Court extended its view on new 
product by inclusion of circumstances, which are similar to prevention of new product.
107
  
As to elimination of competition, it was pointed out that potential elimination of the 
competition is sufficient to declare abuse of art. 102 TFEU. The existence of competitors in 
some niches is irrelevant and seems not to be sufficient to maintain effective competition. The 
Court stated that the relevant market is characterized by significant network effects. Hence, 
the Commission’s intervention was right and protected the competition before it could be 
eliminated.
108
 
According to Ahlborn and Evans the Magill/IMS test is a weak, but lawful rule for refusal to 
supply by dominant firms. The Microsoft test reduces the presumption that a dominant firm 
can freely choose its own trading partners.
109
 GC decided that refusal must be assessed on 
elastic set of exceptional circumstances, regardless of IMS Health conditions.
110
 What is the 
most controversial part of the Microsoft case is that the indispensability condition, which was 
a base for previous case law in compulsory licensing cases was replaced with the elimination 
test based on prediction of competition authority about future market which adopts the elastic 
‘effective competition’ concept, which relates clearly to economic approach.111 Court decided 
that it is necessary that the competitor’s operating systems provide a comparable 
interoperability to Windows architecture like its own products, since Microsoft created a de 
facto standard.
112
 The concept of interoperability proposed by EC included was claimed by 
Microsoft to be too wide and went above that only non-Windows operated machines to 
interact with software and architecture.
113
 The Court decided that in this case competitors 
should have access to all protocols necessary to design software allowing seamless integration 
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of PCs, servers and networks and eventually enabling machines operated on other operating 
systems to work equally with dominant Windows.
114
 
The notion of exceptional circumstances known from IMS Health was read flexible and the 
criteria of indispensability was fulfilled, since a significant competitive importance for 
undertaking active in the market for supply of workgroup server was demonstrated.
115
 
The conditions established in Magill and IMS were loosened to such extent, that the concept 
of new products was abandoned and the notion of risk of eliminating competition was 
introduced. Furthermore, this case might be seen as a new opportunity for competitors to 
acquire rival’s IPR through distinguished art. 102 TFEU, since competition authorities 
lowered the requirements for compulsory licensing. Alhborn and Evans criticized, that this 
ruling takes a step back from the CJEU approach. The CJEU established the new product test 
for refusal to license intellectual property on top of the already stringent indispensability and 
elimination of competition tests for physical property. This test requires evidence that the 
conduct would not just eliminate competition, and whatever benefits that may come from that, 
but also eliminate a new product that consumers would not be able to get otherwise. The GC 
replaced this with its limits on technical development test. Such conclusion seems to be 
disturbing, because it can be de facto applied for any refusal to license case nowadays.
116
 
The condition of objective justification was also interpreted in the manner which is 
questionable. The Commission went against objective justification of protecting the incentive 
to innovation and pointed out that negative impact of order to supply on incentive to invention 
must be outweighed by positive impact on the level of innovation in whole industry and 
Microsoft justification cannot offset the exceptional circumstances.
117
 Since this approach was 
upheld by GC, it opens the gate for future litigations since IPR holders cannot rely anymore 
on objective justification on refusal to supply or license solely on the ground of protection of 
incentive to innovate.
118
 Moreover, there was a shift in burden of proof. Hence, the Court 
relied on the fact that applicant did not provide any evidence that its drive to invest and 
innovate had been adversely affected by the disclosure of protocols. In addition it stated that 
competitors would have been unlikely to gain any economic advantage from merely 
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duplicating the software.
119
 This seems to be in contradiction with what was established in 
IMS where the undertaking should not itself essentially duplicate the product after obtaining 
IPR. There is a lack of genuine product and competition law seems to move forward 
protecting the competitors rather than consumers interest. Such lenient interpretation of the 
IMS Health test may not be able to strike a fair balance between the concurring needs of 
genuine competition, especially in markets on which a leader had already emerged, and the 
demands of maintaining the incentive to invest and innovate.
120
 
This judgment therefore emphasized a need to allow competitors to pursue a ‘follow on’ 
innovation on neighboring market of workgroup server OS, to prevent Microsoft from 
consolidating its leadership on this secondary market and acting as a ‘gatekeeper’ of any 
further innovation.
121
 
The Microsoft case is an exclamation point on jurisprudence. It has increased the 
Commission’s bargaining power and will give firms an increased incentive to agree to 
commitments with the EC, rather than pursuing an appeal.
122
 
It is an example of extending EC’s competencies in protecting competition. Vesterdorf said 
that this judgment undermines the concept of indispensability and elimination of competition 
established in former case law.
123
 The Commission weakened patent law and the rights of 
patent holders to act freely with IPR. In the opinion of some authors wide margin of 
appreciation was given, perhaps even beyond the ruling of the EC.
124
 
As Andreangeli concluded, Microsoft has decisive impact on shaping the currents policies 
adopted by EC in assessment of refusal to license under art. 102 TFEU marking emergence of 
more interventionist attitude.
125
 However, such proactive stance may not be entirely justified 
to deal with the issues arising from the functioning of knowledge-based markets, such as IT 
industry market segments and could imperil many of the incentives that are critical for 
investment and innovation in these areas. 
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4 Standard and market power 
4.1 Standardization 
IMS Health and Microsoft cases concerned involuntarily becoming standards, due the market 
shares and recognition on the relevant market. However, they should not be deemed as a 
factual standard. As for definition, standard is a set of technical specifications that either 
provide or intends to provide a common design for a product or a process. They may be a 
market development (single firm de facto standards and cooperative standards) or be 
promoted by public policy.
126
 The difference between a de facto standard and ‘true’ standard 
is that the latter is a form of voluntarily commitment to share technology in exchange of 
technology implementation widely in the particular industry as the only valid one. 
The objective of the standard is to ensure the interoperability/compatibility of different 
technologies or products.
127
 Those technical specifications might be protected by patent law. 
As presented in the paper of Rudi Bekkers there is fascinating and complex relation between 
standard and IPRs. Whereas standards aim at ensure equal access for all stakeholders, 
the IPRs grant temporary, exclusionary rights.128 The right includes two main features: the 
right to prevent other parties from applying or using the subject matter of the patent and the 
right to license the intellectual property for use.
129
  
 
4.2 How competition law works in standardization 
As the case law of CJEU shows, IPRs should not presumably create a market power by 
themselves. In brief conclusion, the SEP should not either. Nonetheless, there is a concern, 
that patents, incorporated into a standard, might lead to a significant market power and be 
abused as soon as commercialized.
130
 Therefore, in order to assess whether SEP is becoming a 
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tool for abuse of market power the factors such as: potential competition constraints, 
substitutes of protected product, technical development and consumer welfare must be taken 
into consideration before applying art. 102 TFEU. In network industries it may be difficult for 
competitors to displace the prevailing standard, in particular in the presence of significant user 
switching costs. In principle, in such industries an undertaking holding a proprietary essential 
technology may enjoy significant and lasting market power, akin to dominance.
131
 
According to Jones, standard setting may facilitate competition among producers by reducing 
wasteful spending on technology and lowering costs for consumers. Undertakings involved in 
standard setting benefit both through the production of goods that implement the standard and 
from licensing patented technology which contributes, and is essential, to the SEP to other 
implementers.
132
  
By pushing essential IP holders to commit to license on FRAND terms before the standard is 
adopted, the members of the SSO are trying to deter essential IP holders from exercising any 
otherwise legally permissible exclusionary power after adoption.
133
 SSO do not provide 
definition of FRAND. Instead particular licensing terms are usually left to confidential 
bilateral negotiations between the members. Although competition authorities step in when 
dispute arises, like in the Samsung or Rambus case
134
 Companies holding potential SEP are 
asked to disclose their IPRs before standard is finalized. Once those are disclosed, SSO asks 
for commitment to license related patents on FRAND terms to any willing party.
135
 
The trouble comes when standard setting process creates barrier to entry and enables one 
undertaking holding SEP to gain market power by controlling its standard and exclude 
competitors,
136
 i.e. by setting artificially high royalty fees and threating with patent 
injunctions. Marinello emphasized the incomplete character of FRAND commitments, which 
allows abusing a privilege position by conditionally committing to share the technology 
depending on the standard to be adopted and implemented, allowing patent holders to get 
higher royalties.
137
 As Jones accurately pointed out, there might be two dangerous situations 
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implicated by holding SEP. Undertaking enjoys uses market power gained through standard to 
hold up implementers which are at the same time competitors in downstream market by: 
1. Refusal to license, or 
2. offers with unreasonable royalties. 
4.2.1 Assesment of market power 
The adoption and implementation of the standard may result in creation of de facto monopoly 
and affect the effective competition between rival technologies for inclusion in that specific 
iteration of the standard.
138
 As it was stated in case of Qualcomm, the standard-setting process 
may confer substantial market power on a large number of SEP holders in related technology 
markets. As soon as standard has been set, it becomes impossible for implementers to switch 
from SEPs to competing technologies.
139
 On the other hand, the market power weakens as 
soon as alternative products show on the market. The element of substitutability is a crucial in 
assessing the market power. Even in the absence of economically significant substitutes on 
the upstream technology market, if customers on the downstream market can easily switch to 
substitute products that do not incorporate the technology, competitive pressures on the 
product market may be sufficient to prevent the licensor of the proprietary technology from 
holding significant market power. 
140
  
One way of analysing relation between standard and market power is patent value. In 
particular, the American literature has established that the citations of a patent received by 
later patents is highly correlated with the patent’s commercial value,141 which in turn could 
influence the market power of patent holder. If subsequently cited by several later patents, it is 
taken as an influential or important, either commercially or in terms of research potential. 
Thus, future citations for a patent provide a tangible, objective and readily available indication 
of a patent’s value or importance.142 In other words, the importance of patent is determinant 
for assessment of such power, since it entails possibility to rise prices and limit the output 
leading to foreclosure of competitors from relevant market.
143
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Undertakings compete over technology to the extent, where the standard is established and 
one technology is chosen. From that moment competition ceases. As the components of 
standard are complementary, they all become ‘essential’ for implementing the standard. In 
such situation even minor undertakings can ‘hold up’ licenses for excessive royalties by 
threating not to license.
144
 Once technology has been incorporated into a standard, it is 
frequently not possible for implementers to work around the patents, consequently SEPs 
confer enormous hold-up power.
145
 
It has already been seen that numerous patented technologies may be “essential” to a standard. 
Owners of such are likely to acquire market power after the standard is adopted, if it 
subsequently becomes impossible for implementers to invent or design around the patent. In 
such, the standard becomes a barrier to entry, as it is commercially indispensable to comply 
with it.
146
 This however stays in contradiction to what was established by CJEU and codified 
in the Commission’s Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, according to which, “there is no 
presumption that holding or exercising IPR essential to a standard equates to the possession or 
exercise of market power. The question of market power can only be assessed on a case by 
case basis.”147 
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5 Analysis of Samsung case 
5.1 UMTS as essential input 
UMTS is a third generation standard for mobile telecommunications, therefore called 3G. 
This standard supports multimedia phones that can accommodate web-based applications and 
offer audio and video facilities.
148
 It defines how mobile phone chipsets work within mobile 
phone handsets, how those handsets communicate with base station towers, how the calls are 
then routed through cellular and/or landline networks, and how the call is finally received. 
Thus, semiconductor designers and fabricators, handset manufacturers, mobile network 
operators, and firms focused on R&D related to mobile communications are among the many 
members of ETSI working on the 3G standard.
149
 In fact one smartphone device may contain 
more than 250,000 SEPs.
150
 In the mobile telephony sector, manufacturers of 3G or 4G 
mobile devices are generally locked in and unable to design around standards as they must be 
able to certify that their product is standard compliant in order to operate on UMTS and LTE 
networks. In these markets, therefore, SEP holders may frequently be found dominant. It is 
also important to consider whether the exercise of market power is constrained by buyer 
power. According to Chappatte, whenever standards become global, the costs arising from 
switching the technology are generally prohibitive.
151
 It is not disputed in the doctrine that 
inclusion of technology in standard, enhanced by network effect and interoperability locks 
implementers, so it further consequence SEP owner might be able to demand excessive high 
royalties.
152
 Holding a particular patent which is essential for the standard becomes 
automatically the ‘essential input’, necessary to carry on undertaking in the market of mobile 
phones which use this technology.  
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5.2 Why Samsung was under the scope of 
Commission? 
The investigation opened by EC against Samsung
153
 shows, that IPR turned into a leverage to 
control the market by patent injunctions in Member States is abuse of art. 102 TFEU. Such 
claims seem to be in contradiction with competition on the merits. The European Commission 
has opened a formal investigation to assess whether Samsung Electronics has abusively, and 
in contravention of a commitment it gave to the ETSI, used certain of its standard essential 
patent rights to distort competition in European mobile device markets, in breach of EU 
antitrust rules.
154
 It must be clarified however, if such allegations should be justified and 
practised in EU or if it is only a method used by major companies to inflict opponents on the 
relevant market in high technology industries, where IPRs are the core of the competition. 
According to Commission's Guidelines, owners of patents are required to commit to license 
these patents on FRAND terms.
155
 This commitment serves to ensure effective access to the 
standardised technology. When the third generation 3G mobile and wireless 
telecommunications system standards were adopted in Europe, many patent holders, including 
Samsung, gave such commitments to ETSI.
156
 The Guidelines promote a standard-setting 
system that is open and transparent and thereby increases the transparency of licensing costs 
for IPR used in standards.
157
 
5.2.1 Application of ‘exceptional circumstances test’ 
There is no established case law by CJEU on the issue of seeking for injunction by SEP 
holder as an abuse of dominant position.
158
 However, the doctrine of exceptional 
circumstances, where exercise of IPR was concluded abusive, provides an idea to reconsider, 
if Samsung should have been under Commission scrutiny.
159
 Refusal to licence and seeking 
injunction share the same concern, namely distorting the downstream market.
160
 Firstly, it 
                                                 
153
 COMP/C-3/39.939 Samsung - Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents. 
154
 Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against Samsung (press release), Brussels, 31 January 2012, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-89_en.htm. 
155
 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C11, 14.1.2011. 
156
 Ibid. 
157
 Competition: Commission adopts revised competition rules on horizontal co-operation agreements (press 
release), Brussels, 14 December 2010, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-
1702_en.htm?locale=en 
158
 See A. Jones, ( n 130), at p. 17. 
159
 See also P. Camesasca, G. Langus, D. Neven, P. Treacy, Injunctions For Standard-Essential Patents: Justice 
Is Not Blind, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 9(2), Oxford University Press, 2013. 
160
 See A. Jones, (n 130),  at p. 19. 
 33 
must be borne in mind that neither holding of IPR nor exercising constitutes an abuse of 
dominant position per se. The situation changes upon exceptional circumstances. Abuse arises 
from refusing to licence if: separate upstream and downstream markets are identified; the 
IPRs involved are indispensable to compete; the refusal is likely to eliminate all effective 
competition on the secondary market (even if not imminent); the party seeking the license 
wishes to offer a new product, not duplicating that offered by the dominant firm, for which 
there is a consumer demand, or that the refusal to license will prevent the development of the 
secondary market to the detriment of consumers. Everything through damaging innovation or 
the improvement or variety of products downstream without objective justification for the 
refusal.
161
 In such circumstances, the notion of the public interest and effective competition 
will prevail on the balance with exclusivity of rights by compulsory licensing to its 
competitors – as it was reasoned in Microsoft case.162 In EU competition policy, the seeking 
of an injunction may thus be according to EC envisioned as an implied ‘refusal to supply’ or 
to be more accurate, as a ‘constructive’ refusal to supply, since refusals to license IPRs are 
categorized as ‘refusals to supply.163 In the sense that there is no ‘actual’ refusal, but refusal to 
grant a licence on FRAND terms.
164
 
Since the infringement of art. 102 TFEU is found on the basis of exercising the IPRs which 
are necessary for competitors to carry on producing and selling mobile phones it should be 
analysed, whether the situation does match the conditions established in the case law on 
compulsory licensing.  
As to indispensability is must be said that Samsung holds SEP, without which it is not 
possible for a device to work with another ones using the UMTS network. Undoubtedly, this 
condition is already met. It affects compatibility or interoperability that is used as synonyms 
for that purpose. In aforementioned case law it was described, that the competitors tried to 
obtain IPR in order to enter the market with a new product for which there was consumer 
demand. However, in mobile technology market there seem not to be any alternatives for 
manufacturers after implementation of the particular standard, hence, competitors are simply 
locked into the standard.
165
 Moreover, the situation is quite exceptional, since the great 
amount of patents which relate to same product are spread among different manufacturers and 
IPR holders such as for example Samsung, Nokia, Motorola, but also Ericsson or Qualcomm. 
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It is a common practice though that those companies share their patents between themselves 
in order to obtain full portfolio.
166
 As standard lead to dominance, there is a risk that it might 
turn into a barrier to entry since mobile devices, which operate on UMTS network.
167
  
Samsung is both owner of IPR and a manufacturer of a product which implements the 
standardized patent. Unquestionably, the company is active on the downstream market, 
selling mobiles and having a significant market share, enabling it to act independent to certain 
extent from its competitors. If he was merely a SEP holder without any activity in the 
secondary market, there would be no abuse even if refusing to share its patent.
168
 
Taking into consideration the problematic issue of eliminating the competitors, even 
potentially it must be said that injunction is action launched against the infringer, who is a 
potential licensee in case of patent dispute. Jones concluded, that this action relates to 
negotiation and bargaining process as to determine FRAND terms.
169
 Refusal to licence 
becomes abusive, though there is a willing party. Since the offer made by Samsung was 
denied by Apple and negotiations were dropped, it is not so easy to assess whether Apple is 
willing or not to pay royalties to the patent owner for using their technology. It is mistakenly 
considered in literature that FRAND commitment waive the right of SEP owner of protecting 
the IPRs.
170
 There is no such statement in the text of commitment and, as some authors 
highlighted, it should not be considered as a “waiver of seeking injunctive relief.171 Such was 
confirmed in the Dutch court. The District Court denied Samsung’s claims on the basis that 
Samsung made only one offer of 2.4 per cent of royalty so Apple refusing it, did not act as 
unwilling licensee. It was highlighted that patent owner who had committed to grant FRAND 
licence is entitled to exercise his rights in certain circumstances. However in this case it 
looked more as a bad faith. The same court decided that granting the injunctions would put 
Apple under the pressure to agree to non-FRAND conditions simply, because it rejected an 
option for 2.4 per cent of royalty and Samsung did not made any other offer than that.
172
 
Therefore, seemingly the Dutch Court has shown its own view on the following condition in 
this analysis, which is the objective justification. It appears that it is not enough justifiable if 
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Apple refuses the conditions of license and carries on with the undertaking, infringing de 
facto patent of Samsung. 
The issue of a new product was elaborated as not duplicating the one which is produced by 
the owner of essential IPR, however in this case the situation should not be compared in this 
manner, since the manufacturers cross license with each other in order to obtain a full 
portfolio of patents. Mobile phone using the 3G standard is not a duplication, since different 
brands offer different models which although communicate with each other are manufactured 
in different way and contain various particular patents. Apple does not come with any new, 
revolutionary product of which there is a consumer demand, but also does not duplicate 
mobile devices from Samsung actually. Therefore, it might be viewed from the perspective of 
special responsibility of SEP owner not to impede the competition in a way, which abstains 
from competition on the merits. On the other dimension of exceptional circumstances, which 
include objective justification and special responsibility, if Samsung could prove that seeking 
for injunctions protects the research and development and it is not aimed for a hold – up there 
could be a consistency with competition on the merits, without exposure to infringement of 
102 TFEU. The concept of objective justification should be seen from perspective of Post 
Danmark case, where the CJEU decided, that dominant undertaking might avoid art. 102 
TFEU by showing that their conduct is objectively necessary to counterbalance the objective 
economic justification in terms of efficiency that also benefits the consumers.
173
 Seeking 
injunction may be aimed against implementer refusing to bound himself with licence (so-
called unwilling licensee), unless he can prove that the license is not fair and reasonable. 
However, as Contreras wrote, the unwillingness cannot be assumed simply from the fact of 
infringing the standard.
174
 Injunctions are justified if FRAND terms were designated by 
independent court and implementer still refuses to pay royalties. 
The refusal to license combined with seeking for injunctions clearly indicates a will to 
eliminate competition, which obviously harms the consumer welfare by preventing 
development of secondary market. However, if in the first place the refusal was not included 
in exceptional circumstances it would implicate that seeking for injunction is not anti-
competitive. The strongest argument against the injunction and core defence against the SEP 
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holder, who refuses to licence, is the ‘willingness of a party’ adopted in ‘Orange book’175 
case. 
5.2.2 Orange book case 
The Federal Supreme Court held, that defence to a claim for injunctive relief based on patent 
infringement may be available on the basis of the ‘dolo agit’ principle.176 According to this 
principle, no one can sue for a benefit that he would have to return immediately upon receipt. 
In this judgment, the German court decided that refusing to grant a license on FRAND terms 
to the defendant constitutes abuse of a dominant position. This claim was based on both 
German and EU competition law. If defendant’s claim for a compulsory license were to be 
successful, then the plaintiff would never receive the benefit of an injunction, and thus 
according to the dolo agit principle he cannot claim an injunction.
177
 However, the court had 
elaborated that abuse of dominant position with a contractual bad faith is present if two 
conditions are met. Firstly, the party wishing to obtain a license must be a willing licensee. It 
means that he had made an unconditional offer to conclude a license agreement that the patent 
proprietor cannot unreasonably reject and the proposed licensee must stay bound by this offer. 
Secondly, the proposed licensee has to comply with the obligations on which the use of the 
licensed subject matter depends, and according to the license agreement still to be concluded, 
if he already uses the subject matter of the patent before his offer is accepted. This means in 
particular that the proposed licensee has to pay the royalties resulting from the contract or 
ensure their payment.
178
 The requirement impute obligation upon licensee to behave in a way 
that demonstrates its genuine willingness to take a license on FRAND terms. Therefore, if 
implementer fails to make an offer complying with the requirement it should not be 
considered as SEP holder fault and injunction should be granted.
179
 
According to the Commission, the Orange Book case should not apply to Samsung since the 
German Federal Court of Justice's ruling did not specifically relate to SEP. The Motorola 
decision
180
 however concludes, that if the ruling was to be interpreted as meaning that a 
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willing licensee is not entitled to challenge the validity, infringement and essentiality of the 
SEPs in question, it would be anti-competitive.
181
 
 
5.3 Patent protection as an abuse of dominant 
position 
There is a clash between the right of access to new technology and the exercise of the 
excluding powers of patents. The relationship between them shows, that enjoying exclusive 
rights and preventing third parties from infringing patent in exceptional circumstances might 
be in contradiction with competition law. According to Tritton, where an undertaking is 
dominant in a particular market but any IPR that the undertaking owns is not a barrier to entry 
to that market, it will be very rare that the exercise of the rights of IPR will be objectionable. 
However, in contrast, where IPR are actually creating such barrier, the purported exercise of 
such rights of dominant’s IPR may be subject to considerable scrutiny under art. 102 
TFEU.
182
 Such exercise is detrimental to the interest of consumer, as it prevents the 
technological development, creation of new products, elimination of competition or imposing 
high prices on royalties which in the consequence affects the final product price. Exercising 
IPR that limits the production in unjustified way is an abuse, even though it is a nature of 
patent to limit the production and protect the technical development being available for 
competitors.
183
  
Samsung has sued Apple in particular European courts for infringing a number of its 
(FRAND encumbered) patents, relating to technology essential to the 3G standard. Since the 
competitor had access to the technology, Samsung decided to claim for injunctions, with the 
alleged purpose of preventing Apple from using essential patent, indicating a goal for the 
foreclosure from the relevant market. European courts have similarly rejected injunction 
applications by Samsung, and also IPCom v Nokia
184
 the High Court of England & Wales, 
declined to grant an injunction sought by IPCom against Nokia in relation to a patent essential 
to the 3G standard which would exclude Nokia from selling its products in the UK. 
185
 Given 
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that Nokia had declared itself willing to take and to be entitled to a licence in relation to valid 
patents on FRAND terms and IPCom acknowledged that it had made a FRAND declaration, 
the judge failed to see why an injunction should be granted.
186
 The opposite approach was 
presented in German lower courts, where injunctions were usually granted to SEP holders, 
such as in Motorola v Microsoft judgement
187
 or Motorola v Apple
188
, where it also ordered 
Apple to cease offering mobile devices using the General Packet  
Radio Service standard, which incorporated the claimant’s SEPs, even though Apple had 
made numerous licence offers to the claimant to pay a royalty on FRAND terms.
189
 The 
possibility of obtaining injunctions in Germany gave a leverage to SEP holders to successfully 
secure EU-wide licences to their SEP portfolios on ‘advantageous’ terms. Faced with the 
prospect of having products unavoidably and permanently barred from a major market such as 
Germany, many smartphone manufacturers have agreed to pay significant royalties demanded 
by SEP holders on a broader territorial basis. For example, Motorola has been able to demand 
a 2.25 per cent royalty, and Samsung a 2.4 per cent royalty, of final products implementing 
the standard, despite the fact that there are vast numbers of other patents which read on 
3G/UMTS and related standards.
190
 
5.3.1 Huawei v ZTE case 
The question if exercising IPRs should be available to SEP holders, who acquired dominance 
through the IPR is a subject in a preliminary ruling of the recent Huawei v ZTE case
191
. In the 
request for preliminary ruling, the German court made questions referring to the refusal to 
license. Firstly, whether a SEP holder, who has made a FRAND commitment abuses a 
dominant position bringing an injunction claim in court against a patent infringer, who was 
willing to negotiate such a licence. Secondly, in the circumstances, when implementer, who 
has presented an acceptable, unconditional offer to the SEP holder to enter into a licensing 
agreement, which the patentee cannot refuse, unfairly impeding the patent infringer or 
discriminating against it, and the patent infringer takes steps to act in accordance with such an 
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offer with respect to past infringements in anticipation of any licence to be granted prior to 
use. In other words, the CJEU is being asked, whether the Orange-Book-Standard is sufficient 
to prevent abusive conduct by SEP holders or whether art. 102 TFEU applies more stringently 
to constrain the ordinary rights of IPR owners, where the IP at issue is a FRAND encumbered 
SEP. The background of these preliminary questions is that German lower court favour SEP 
owners and were exposed for accusation of non-sincere cooperation with EU law. In 
particular, considering the rulings in other member states were injunctions were mostly 
denied. According to Petit, this case goes against the background of Orange Book case and it 
is a reflection for what the EC has expressed in statement of objections sent to Samsung and 
Motorola. 
192
 In the Motorola decision however, the EC left it open whether art. 102 TFEU 
further restricts the possibility of the holder of SEPs in seeking and enforcing injunctions.
193
 
The preliminary ruling will be probably a milestone, since cases involving SEP and 
injunctions relief were not a subject to CJEU yet and usually the parties under the pressure of 
competition authorities were dropping the lawsuits, not appealing and, as Samsung did in 3G 
case – made commitments in order to avoid sanctions from the Commission. 
 
5.3.2 Comments on Samsung’s commitment 
On 29
th
 of April 2014 the EC accepted legally binding commitment made by Samsung, 
according to which the injunction relief is going to be dropped against licensees who sign up 
to specific licensing framework. Samsung decided to be bound by FRAND terms, which are 
set by an independent court, or by arbitrator chosen by the parties. The EC calls this 
commitment a ‘safe harbour’ for those who seek to obtain the licence on UMTS.194 The 
aforementioned framework provides for a negotiation period of maximum 12 months and a 
third party determination of FRAND terms. The International Chamber of Commerce in Paris 
submitted a concern relating to the commitment finding issues which make it non-effective 
and inconsistent. They pointed out length of adjudication process composed of two rounds of 
arbitrary proceedings, which creates undue delay in assessing if terms are FRAND or not.
195
 
Lack of clarity on the law will create a situation where infringers will have the incentive not 
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to negotiate a license and engage in “reverse hold up”. Next of all, they have found the most 
crucial and dangerous clause present in the commitment, which puts a shadow on the whole 
investigation and result of the commitment. Namely in paragraph 13 of the commitment 
Samsung reserves his right to de facto revoking its commitment and reopen the proceedings 
subjectively to Huawei v ZTE preliminary ruling when it is available.
196
 Since it is the first 
case, which is going to be analysed by CJEU in the context of SEP and possible injunctions 
Samsung seems to rely upon the CJEU view and it is ready to start over with claims if the 
preliminary view will differ from the opinion of Commission or national courts. 
There is a considerable concern that the Commission is using the commitments procedure too 
frequently to close antitrust cases, meaning it does not have to develop legal analysis in a 
way, which will prove its case or help to clarify the law.
197
 This is what also happened in 
Samsung case. The EC did not analysed market position of Samsung, assuming holding the 
dominant position because of the ownership of the SEP. Therefore, the reference to the CJEU 
in Huawei should shed light on the principles developed in these circumstances. 
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6 Conclusions 
The modern technology seems to change the view on dominance in the light of 102 TFEU. 
The definition of economic strength, preventing competition and acting independently extends 
its applicability to the holders of SEP, who allegedly acquired market power simply by 
gaining possibility to exclude competitors from using their IPRs. This leads de facto to 
elimination of competition that stands against EU antitrust rules. When talking about products 
in the relevant market the major feature is substitutability. Substitutability was extended to 
interoperability and indispensability for the sake of IPR, which are necessary to carry on the 
undertaking. This is the dynamic function of antitrust to meet the circumstances on the market 
of modern technologies by using an analogy to intangible products. Market shares, which 
were so far the strong and reliable tool used to assess the market power seem to be diminished 
or significantly undermined, since patent owner does not need to be the biggest player in 
downstream market, but it is sufficient to tag him as dominant for holding the IPR, which 
everyone else requires to manufacture their products.  
Article 102 TFEU imposes special responsibility on SEP owners, which in consequence leads 
to compulsory licensing. Holding IPR, according to CJEU should not presume dominance. 
However in order to prevent undertakings from creating barriers to entry the doctrine of 
exceptional circumstances was established and it is a breakthrough. This doctrine includes a 
test in which refusal to licence can be viewed as abuse of dominance. In prominent cases 
starting from Magill, through IMS Health and Microsoft the competition authorities 
emphasized that refusal to license is abusive as it prevents the emergence of a new product, of 
which there is consumer demand; in a way, which is not objectively justified and preserves 
the IPR owner the product market, eliminating competition. The doctrine was misunderstood 
and neglected by the EC. Nowadays the EC is eager to force undertakings to share the 
technology for the sake of antitrust law.  
Through the analysis of Samsung refusal to licence and seeking for injunction reliefs it was 
found that the reasoning behind exceptional circumstances might not apply in Samsung case, 
or at least it is questionable. Although the patent is essential and preserves entering into 
secondary market, there is a question if it was objectively unjustified solely on the grounds 
that Apple refused 2.4% of royalty. In the situation where FRAND terms are not determined 
concrete, it is unreasonable to blame SEP owner for abuse if he stands for the offer, rejecting 
the counteroffer. The EC did not perform a detailed investigation and analysis on Samsung 
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market position, nor the counteroffers to determine if it was or not FRAND. The alleged 
dominance is based on holding some of many patents required for devices using 3G to 
function and abuse relates to exercise of IPR, which goes against from what was established 
by CJEU before. So far, the EC was successful with convincing companies to abstain from 
those practices and make commitments to licence their patent. However, there might be a big 
shift in this approach. Companies could rely on Orange Book Case standard, which provided 
with defence for infringers of patent who were denied access to essential technology, while 
they have been willing to pay royalties. Recently though, the German court has sent the 
request for preliminary ruling, asking if Orange book standard should be applied. This leads 
to assumption that the current situation is going too far to support and defend infringing 
competitors rather than owner of IPR and competition. If the preliminary ruling will differ 
from what is practised now by the EC, most companies holding the SEP will change their 
policy against competitors who are forcing them to go as low as possible with terms claiming 
FRAND terms. In such situation Samsung will be able to revoke the commitment, since it 
preserved such right in the commitment, accepted by the EC.  
The probable core of the problem in standardization nowadays is that the policy of SSO do 
not provide clear answer on how FRAND terms should be assessed and by whom. It was left 
for the consideration of contractual parties. The competitors cannot reach a compromise  and 
as the SEP owner claimed for injunction relief against those who use patent without paying 
the royalties might successfully defended themselves by Orange Book standard and the EC 
seems to support that adding the background of social benefit coming from widening the 
market where IPR do not create entry barrier. 
The incentives to innovation created by IPRs produce new competitors on existing markets 
and indeed create new products, which open up entirely new markets. Secondly, it is 
presumed that the licensing of IPRs is in general pro-competitive as well as pro-innovative in 
its effects. IP licensing also adds new products to markets that either add new competitors to 
existing markets or form new markets.
198
 Too heavy burden on the exercise of IPRs could 
discourage investment in IPRs in the EU. In this more enlightened time of modern 
technologies, the competition law accepts that exercise of IPR contributes to innovation, but 
also it is emerging trend, that such conduct, even when lawful under Intellectual Property 
Law, becomes unlawful from the competition law. In such cases, EC competition law does 
not confer immunity upon the exercise of an IPR simply because it is consistent with the rules 
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of IP legislation.
199
 Instead, it tends to reserve a right to intervene in particular cases. Is this a 
good solution? In this paper it is shown that dominant player does not need to be held 
responsible for distortion of the competition by protecting his IPRs. Standardization entails a 
fair deal between owner and willing party and should be based on mutual trust and good faith. 
Whenever one of those seems to be missing it would be a good ground to invoke objective 
justification for refusal to licence. The interference by EC is a temporary solution to overcome 
the imbalance in the technology market. Laudable attitude might however bring more 
damage, then good. If dominant companies cannot rely anymore on their patents, the future of 
standardization will be threatened. Perhaps companies will become not interested in 
competing, where the European Commission brings ‘equity law’ in force, rather than 
following the positive law.     
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